The transit governance model in Chicago: an outlier
Transit governance reform is intertwined with needed funding reforms to address the looming transit fiscal cliff. Improved governance and adequate funding both are necessary to improve the region’s transit system.
This post compares the current form of transit governance in the Chicago region with that of major transit agencies in the United States. It finds that there are two distinct models of transit governance among major transit agencies. Transit governance in this region fits neither model; it is a “peculiar hybrid” as described by one observer. The post closes by showing how the proposed Metropolitan Mobility Authority Act, introduced in the General Assembly in late April, would allow this region to transition to the integrated regional authority model that prevails in a number of peer regions such as New York City, Boston, and Philadelphia.
Transit governance in Chicago region
In its Plan of Action for Regional Transit (PART), which was commissioned by the General Assembly, the Chicago Metropolitan Agency for Planning (CMAP) studied the current transit governance structure. CMAP found that the governance structure is fragmented and recommended reform. At the top is the Regional Transit Authority (RTA), which has a board of directors comprised of representatives from throughout the six-county RTA region. The RTA Act establishes two so-called RTA “operating divisions”—Metra (commuter rail) and Pace Suburban Bus (suburban bus and paratransit in the region). These RTA operating divisions, however, are also separate agencies with their own boards of directors and are thus typically referred to as “service boards.” This means the RTA despite its name and regional scope has no direct responsibility for transit operations in the region. To complicate matters further, the Chicago Transit Authority, which operates bus and rail transit in the City of Chicago and carries over 80% of the riders in the region, is a service board but is not an RTA operating division.
The current fragmented state of transit governance is illustrated graphically:
Transit governance in other regions
There are over 1,000 public transit agencies operating in the wide variety of urbanized areas in the United States. There is a wide variety of board sizes, director selection mechanisms, and the like. (Transit Cooperative Research Program, Public Transit Board Governance Guidebook (2002)) This variety makes conclusive generalizations about transit governance applicable to all transit agencies difficult if not impossible.
Recognizing these challenges, MPC focused on the governance structures of the fifteen largest US transit agencies by ridership. It began this effort with the hypothesis that there would be no discernable governance model or models. MPC’s analysis, however, found that there are two distinct transit governance models among the largest US transit agencies.
The first is the integrated regional authority governance model. This is a transit agency that operates multiple modes of transit service over a multi-county area under the direction of a single board of directors. Directors may be appointed by elected officials or elected themselves. Some agencies function as divisions of the state department of transportation. The integrated regional authority model is associated with transit systems that were mature at the time of their transition from private sector to public sector control. Examples include the MTA in New York City, WMATA in Washington DC, and MBTA in Boston.
The second transit governance approach that emerged during MPC’s analysis is the county-specific governance model. This model involves a transit agency that provides transit service in the most-heavily urbanized county in a metro area. Transit service outside the most-heavily urbanized county, including commuter rail, is typically provided by other transit agencies. Examples of this model include LA Metro, King County Metro (Seattle), and Miami-Dade Transit. As with the other model, methods for selection of directors differ.
In both models, there are typically a number of suburban transit providers with service within suburban communities and connecting those communities to the commuter rail and the urban core networks.
The Chicago region transit governance system falls outside both models
The Chicago region is a transit governance outlier. The RTA is akin to an integrated regional authority but its so-called operating divisions—Metra and Pace—are separate agencies with their own boards and the RTA has no direct control over their operations. By far the largest transit agency in the region—the CTA—also has its own board. The CTA is not even nominally an operating division of the RTA even though it provides over 80% of transit trips in the region.
The CTA has some of the marks of a county-specific governance structure. Its authorized service area extends beyond the City of Chicago into the most heavily urbanized portions of Cook County. Yet, Cook County has no appointments to the CTA board; that board has appointees from the Chicago Mayor and the Illinois Governor only. While not an RTA operating division, the CTA is subject to RTA oversight and it is dependent on the RTA for substantial discretionary funding.
Metra is akin to a regional rail agency, like those often found in metro areas with a county-specific transit agency. Yet, Metra’s board lacks significant representation from the City of Chicago, where the vast majority of Metra’s trips originate or terminate, a substantial number of Metra stations are located (30%), and from where a substantial number of riders originate. Metra is also a nominal RTA operating division and subject to RTA oversight.
Pace is akin to suburban bus services found elsewhere, but Pace is regional in scope rather than specific to a local jurisdiction. Pace is a nominal RTA operating division, but is its own agency with its own board, yet also subject to RTA oversight.
Each of the fifteen largest US transit agencies operates in regions with metropolitan planning organizations (MPOs). While the Chicago region has its own MPO—CMAP—it has something that none of the other agencies studied have—a separate transit funding budget and oversight agency, the RTA.
The anomalous nature of transit governance in the Chicago region has long been recognized. For example, in Getting to the Route of It: The Role of Governance in Regional Transit (2014) the Eno Center for Transportation was sharply critical of the transit governance structure in the Chicago region, tying our governance flaws to the persistent funding challenges faced then…and now:
The transit funding challenges in northeastern Illinois stem from a history of fragmentation and decentralization in terms of the governance of transit services, tension (and distrust) between the urban center and the suburban collar, and a lack of engagement on the part of the State of Illinois. The region’s continual transit funding deficits have in part been the result of its governance structure. A culmination of circumstances has led to political gridlock that has rendered the region unable to effectively maintain, coordinate, and fund its transit network. [pgs. 16-17]
The Eno report goes on to describe transit governance in the Chicago region as a “peculiar hybrid,” a finding consistent with this MPC analysis a decade later:
The RTA is a peculiar hybrid of a regional transit organization and a quasi-MPO. Like a regional transit organization, it controls transit funding for the region. But like most MPOs, it actually winds up having very little power to enforce funding decisions. The inherent problem is that RTA occupies an ambiguous middle ground where it is powerful enough to create challenges and bureaucracy, but not powerful enough to be productive in pursuing regional goals. [pg. 20]
Some have argued that the Chicago region with its regional transit authority and three service boards, each with their independent boards of directors, is not anomalous because in other metropolitan regions there are an even greater number of transit agencies. The Bay Area, for example, has over 20 transit agencies.
This comparison is inapt. The Bay Area lacks a regional transit authority. Instead, it has a major transit agency—SFMTA—that is organized on the county-specific governance model and two regional rail authorities, BART and Caltrain. At the local and subregional level there are a sizable number of transit agencies. In other words, lacking a regional transit authority, the Bay Area is not analogous to the Chicago region and is not an appropriate benchmark.
The pertinent question is whether there is a major metropolitan area with a regional transit authority that also has service boards with their own independent boards. At least among the 15 largest US transit agencies, the answer is no. The Chicago region is an anomaly among its true peers.
Transitioning to the integrated regional authority governance model
The proposed Metropolitan Mobility Authority (MMA) Act (SB 3937) would transition the Chicago region from its “peculiar hybrid” form of transit governance to the integrated regional authority governance model. The MMA Act tracks the Option #1 governance reform that CMAP recommends in PART. Like the Eno report quoted above, CMAP saw that governance reform is a key feature of a funding reform package that will provide the transit system with more resources to improve the frequency, reliability, and safety of transit services.
The Act establishes the MMA as the single agency with a single board with the responsibility—and the accountability—for operating the Chicago region’s transit system. Unlike the current structure where RTA “operating divisions” are in fact separate agencies with separate boards, under the MMA Act CTA, Metra, and Pace would become true operating divisions of the MMA. The resulting horizontal and vertical integration of transit service providers in a single agency with a single board should facilitate improved, better coordinated, and more consistent transit service in the region. The MMA should be better situated than the current four transit agencies, each with their own and sometimes conflicting goals, priorities, and executive direction, to secure more funding from state and federal sources and more cooperation from the Illinois Department of Transportation and other roadway operators to improve bus operations.
Conclusion
MPC’s analysis found that the transit governance structure in the Chicago region falls outside the two prevailing transit governance models for large US transit agencies. While MPC believes that this region should not be bound by what other regions are doing, the “peculiar hybrid” that is our current governance structure is suboptimal. The proposed Metropolitan Mobility Authority Act would allow this region to join peers in Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and elsewhere and have an integrated regional transit authority. As CMAP and others have recognized, governance and funding reforms must go hand in hand.